rawls rejects utilitarianism because

They both turn on the possibility that some people would lose out when everyones interests are aggregated together. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. See The Appeal of Political Liberalism, Chapter Eight in this volume. The dispute about whether utilitarianism is too risky or not. I like TV as much as the next person, but I care about my child in a different way. Has Rawls given reasons to prefer his principles of justice over something like these? This is a point that he emphasizes in response to Habermas (PL 42133), and it explains what he means when he says in the index to PL (455) that justice is always substantive and never purely procedurala remark that might otherwise seem inconsistent with the role that Theory assigns to pure procedural justice. To be sure, Rawls does not claim that the political conception is deductively derivable from classical utilitarianism, only that the classical view might support the political conception as a satisfactory and perhaps the best workable approximation [to what the principle of utility would on balance require] given normal social conditions (PL 171). If a radically inegalitarian distributioneither of satisfaction itself or of the means of satisfactionwill result in the greatest total satisfaction overall, the inequality of the distribution is no reason to avoid it. Rawls observes that the distribution of satisfaction within the society has no intrinsic significance for classical utilitarianism. And in both cases, this argument from the perspective of the parties corresponds to an independent criticism of utilitarianism as being excessively willing to sacrifice some people for the sake of others. However, a number of critics have argued that Rawls's position has important features in common with utilitarianism, features in virtue of which his view is open to some of the very same objections that he levels against the utilitarian. That being the case, it is not clear what could reasonably count as the natural baseline or what the ethical credentials of any such baseline might plausibly be thought to be.26 Moreover, as the size of the human population keeps growing, as the scale and complexity of modern institutions and economies keep increasing, and as an ever more sophisticated technological and communications infrastructure keeps expanding the possibilities of human interaction, the obstacles in the way of a satisfactory account of the presocial baseline loom larger, and the pressure to take a holistic view of distributive justice grows greater.27 In their different ways, the Rawlsian and utilitarian accounts of justice are both responsive to this pressure.28. This is the sort of argument that Samuel criticized earlier. Mill argued for the desirability of breaking down the sharp and hostile division between the producers or workers, on the one hand, and the capitalists or owners, on the other hand, T or F: According to libertarianism, liberty is the prime value, and justice consists in being free from the interference of others. The second is that the life prospects of individuals are so densely and variously interrelated, especially through their shared participation in social institutions and practices, that virtually any allocation of resources to one person has morally relevant implications for other people. At the same time, it is a measure of Rawls's achievement that utilitarianism's predominant status has been open to serious question ever since A Theory of Justice set forth his powerful alternative vision. Given the importance that the parties attach to the basic liberties, Rawls maintains that they would prefer to secure their liberties straightaway rather than have them depend upon what may be uncertain and speculative actuarial calculations (TJ 1601). The first, which I have already mentioned, is Rawls's aspiration to produce a theory that shares utilitarianism's systematic and constructive character. Thus, I believe it is misleading when Rawls says, at the end of his discussion of relative stability in section 76: These remarks are not intended as justifying reasons for the contract view. The argument is that the parties, knowing that they exist and wishing only to advance their own interests, would have no desire to maximize the net aggregate satisfaction, especially since doing so might require growth in the size of the population even at the expense of a significant reduction in the average utility per person. <> Under normal conditions neither would permit serious infringements of liberty while under extraordinary conditions either might. Both the theories are systematic and constructive in character, both treat commonsense notions of justice as deriving from a more authoritative standard, and both are committed to distributive holism, in the sense that they regard the justice of any assignment of benefits to a particular individual as dependent on the justice of the overall distribution of benefits in society. They can assign probabilities to outcomes in the society they belong to. In, It is worth noting that, in his earlier paper, Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. This means that, in a society whose basic structure was regulated by the two principles, allegiance to those principles would, under favorable conditions, develop naturally out of preexisting psychological materials. endobj The second makes sense, though. To the extent that this is so, they can help to illuminate Rawls's complex attitude toward utilitarianism: an attitude that is marked by respect and areas of affinity as well as by sharp disagreements. We talked about Rawlss contention that the parties in the original position would reject maximizing average utility as the fundamental principle for their society. Utilitarianism seeks to answer the question: how can we maximize people's, "A utilitarian would have to answer that the pain to the victim outweighs the pleasure to the rapist. Critics of utilitarianism, he says, have pointed out that many of its implications run counter to our moral convictions and sentiments, but they have failed to construct a workable and systematic moral conception to oppose it ( TJ, p. viii/xvii rev. (7) Raised to appreciate the value of nature, she paid rapt attention to sounds and sights, enabling her not only to locate food but to warn the others of possible danger. x\wHnrA1lf7n;gkDTu}''oE7bD`/3O T:%3?*e Fp=wWZ8*|RvT90dy,1{|3D-gE{[*] V|+5Y(F=2gxcZ}IQh6\9;;bsMzal{z )TreGw$a'J6sm~O#|f7$k2Sb1_OGrm%b[Cmx(d-&M- Despite the vigor of his arguments against utilitarianism, however, some critics have contended that Rawls's own theory displays some of the very same features that he criticizes in the utilitarian position. If that happened, they would seek to change the society (contrary to the finality condition) and, of course, they would not accept its rules (contrary to the stability condition). WebQuestion 4 Rawls rejects utilitarianism because: a) He saw it as a threat. Rawls argues there that because his principles embody an idea of reciprocity or mutual benefit, and because reciprocity is the fundamental psychological mechanism implicated in the development of moral motivation, the motives that would lead people to internalize and uphold his principles are psychologically continuous with developmentally more primitive mechanisms of moral motivation. Although Rawls first outlines this strategy in section 26, it is important to emphasize that what he provides in that section is only a sketch of the qualitative structure of the argument that needs to be made if the case for these principles is to be conclusive (TJ 150). ]#Ip|Tx]!$f?)g%b%!\tM)E]tgI "cn@(Mq&8DB>x= rtlDpgNY@cdrTE9_)__? Finally, it should give a list of individual liberties great, but not absolute, weight.. But this makes it even less clear why classical utilitarianism should be associated with perfect altruism. T. M. Scanlon, Rawls' Theory of Justice, H. L. A. Hart, Between Utility and Rights, in. For criticism of this emphasis, see, The proviso is essential. I will explain why I do not regard this argument as persuasive, but will also indicate how it points to some genuine affinities between justiceasfairness and utilitarian ideas, affinities that I will then explore in greater depth. Thus, in looking at the two versions of utilitarianism from the standpoint of the original position, a surprising contrast (TJ 189) between them is revealed. In light of this assessment of the utilitarian conception of the good and his own defence of a pluralistic conception, Rawls's comment in section 15, that utilitarianism and his theory agree that the good is the satisfaction of rational desire (TJ 923) seems misleading at best. This is a decisive objection provided we assume that the correct regulative principle for anything depends on the nature of that thing, and that the plurality of distinct persons with separate systems of ends is an essential feature of human societies (TJ 29). In this way, many persons are fused into one (TJ 27). (These conditions are listed in a handout.). a. Adam Smith defends capitalism by appealing to the idea of a natural, moral right to property. As a result, Rawls writes, we often seem forced to choose between utilitarianism and intuitionism. That is, they help to show that the two principles are an adequate minimum conception of justice in a situation of great uncertainty. The aim now is to show how liberal institutions can achieve stability in conditions of pluralism by drawing on diverse sources of moral support. When she was just a young girl, Sacagawea's tribe was attacked by an enemy tribe, the Hidatsa, and she was captured. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox. Thoughts about God, culture, and the Real Jesus. After reviewing John Rawls's arguments against utilitarianism in A Theory of Justice and then examining Michael Sandel's and Robert Nozick's criticisms of those arguments, Scheffler points to three important similarities between utilitarianism and Rawls's own theory. (6) Sacagawea, with the baby on her back, and seemingly heedless of danger, calmly salvaged the equipment. A particularly difficult conflict between the explorers and a group of Sioux, in South Dakota, convinced Lewis and Clark that they needed an interpreter. These are important differences between the two theories. Utilitarianism, in Rawls's view, has been the dominant systematic moral theory in the modern liberal tradition. Indeed, the point goes further. The project is Second, however, they have wondered why, if Rawls believes that it would be unduly risky for the parties to rely on probabilities that are not grounded in information about their society, he fails to provide them with that information. <> As applied to Rawls, this characterization does not seem right, given the lexical priority of his first principle over his second principle and the fact that he treats the question of distributive shares as a matter of pure procedural justice. Furthermore, hedonism is the symptomatic drift of teleological theories (TJ 560) both because agreeable feeling may appear to be an interpersonal currency (TJ 559) that makes social choice possible and because hedonism's superficial hospitality to varied ways of life enables it to avoid the appearance of fanaticism and inhumanity (TJ 556). Intuitionism, as Rawls understands it, holds that there are a plurality of first principles of justice which may conflict on particular occasions. Nevertheless, the impulse to treat some form of utilitarianism as a candidate for inclusion in the consensus, when considered in the context of Rawls's aims in Political Liberalism and his sympathy for certain aspects of the utilitarian doctrine, no longer seems mysterious.33 Whether or not the tensions between that impulse and his forceful objections to utilitarianism can be satisfactorily resolved, they provide a salutary reminder of the complexity of Rawls's attitude toward modern moral philosophy's predominant systematic theory. See, for example, section 2 of The Basic Structure as Subject, where he associates the comprehensive interpretation with Sidgwick (PL 2602). Defenders of the principle of average utility have challenged Rawls's arguments in a variety of ways. Thus it would not occur to them to acknowledge the principle of utility in its hedonistic form. It may be enough to show non-utilitarians why they reject utilitarianism, though. % I want to call attention to three of these commonalities. The Fine Tuning Argument for God's Existence, Freedom from Self-Abuse (Cutting) - Sermon, The Lemonade-Twaddle of the Consumer Church, Five Views On the Destiny of the Unevangelized. The risk could be very small or very large. In short, utilitarianism gives the aggregative good precedence over the goods of distinct individuals whereas Rawls's principles do not. They assume the probability of being any particular person (outside the Original Position, in the real world) is equal to the probability of being any other person. endobj "A utilitarian would have to endorse the execution." Yet Rawls argues that the original position does have features that make reliance on the maximin rule appropriate and that the parties would reject average utility as unduly risky. Rawls believes that, of all traditional theories of justice, the contract theory is the one which best approximates our considered judgments of justice. Whereas the idea of arranging social institutions so as to maximize the good might seem attractive if there were a unique good at which all rational action aims, it makes more sense, in light of the heterogeneity of the good, to establish a fair framework of social cooperation within which individuals may pursue their diverse ends and aspirations. (3) The planning of the expedition, however, showed some disregard for the realities of the journey. Since there is, accordingly, no inconsistency between Rawls's principles and his criticism of utilitarianism, there is no need for him to take drastic metaphysical measures to avoid it.21. Rawls hopes to derive principles of social justice that rational persons would However, it directs us to arrange social and political institutions in such a way as to maximize the aggregate satisfaction or good, even if this means that some individuals' ability to have good livesin utilitarian termswill be seriously compromised, and even though there is no sentient being who experiences the aggregate satisfaction or whose good is identified with that aggregate. As I have argued elswhere, neither Rawls nor the utilitarian thinks about distributive justice in this way.29 For them, the principles of distributive justice, holistically understood, are fixed without reference to any prior notion of desert, and individuals may then be said to deserve the benefits to which they are entitled according to the criteria established by just institutions. As Rawls emphasizes, utilitarianism does not share his view that special first principles are required for the basic structure (PL 262), notwithstanding its broad institutional emphasis, nor does it agree that the question of distributive shares should be treated as a matter of pure procedural justice (TJ 889). Result: Permitting some people to be better off than average resuls in the least-well-off Suppose Rawls is right and people find it unacceptable to lose out in these ways, such that they will be desperately unhappy or even rebellious. Of course, to say this would be to concede that Rawls takes the conventional distinctions among empiricallyindividuated human beings even less seriously than does utilitarianism. So now we have one question answered. Note, however, that under the index entry for average utilitarianism (606), there is a subheading that reads: as teleological theory, hedonism the tendency of. ), Find out more about saving to your Kindle, Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CCOL0521651670.013. Some people understandably abhor many of the tendencies in modern life that create pressure to think holistically about distributive justice, and believe that our moral thought, rather than seeking to accommodate those tendencies, should serve as a source of resistance to them. To save content items to your account, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 79. The other two involve trying to show that the parties would choose Rawlss principles of justice in order to avoid results that they would find unacceptable. Nor, he maintains, does the irreducible diversity of our ends mean that rational choice is impossible. This is partly because Rawls's formulation has appeared to some readers to straddle two or more of the following claims: 1) a claim of metaphysical error, to the effect that utilitarianism simply fails to notice that persons are ontologically distinct, 2) a claim of moral error, to the effect that utilitarianism tolerates unacceptable interpersonal tradeoffs, and thereby fails to attach sufficient moral significance to the ontological distinctions among persons, and 3) an explanatory claim, to the effect that utilitarianism fails to attach sufficient moral significance to the ontological distinctions among persons because it extends to society as a whole the principle of choice for one person. {+ aa?=,|[4/ Of course, this is not to deny that the principle of average utility would have more appeal than classical utilitarianism for the parties in the original position. He and Sacagawea joined the expedition. But this suggests that the parties reject theories of justice that incorporate monistic conceptions of the good because Rawls's argument for pluralism has led him to design the original position in such a way as to guarantee that they will do so. But its fair to say that it has one dominant theme. The fact that Rawls agrees with utilitarianism about the desirability of identifying a clear and constructive solution to the priority problem leads more or less directly to the second point of agreement. In the parts we did read, Rawls argued that they would have decisive reasons not to follow this chain of reasoning and so they have decisive reasons to reject utilitarianism. We have to ask how, on Utilitarian principles, this influence is to be exercised. A French-Canadian trader named Toussaint Charbonneau lived with the Hidatsa. T or F: Libertarians involves a commitment to leaving market relations - buying,selling, and other exchanges - totally unrestricted. This aspect of Rawls's attitude toward utilitarianism has attracted less attention. With respect to the first condition, Rawls observes in section 28 that, from the standpoint of the original position, the prima facie appeal of average utility depends on the assumption that one has an equal chance of turning out to be anybody once the veil of ignorance is lifted. Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 80. b. Adam Smith denies that human beings are, by, According to Locke, a. individuals are morally entitled to take others property b. property is a moral right c. individuals are not morally entitled to the products of their labor d. property, How do these four features of capitalism relate to you as an individual residing in the "land of free enterprise.?" Rather, the original position has been structured so that utilitarianism is guaranteed to lose. . (By the way, Judge Richard Posner, who might be called Jeremy Bentham redivivus, accepts just this view of rape in his Sex and Reason. By itself, the claim that even the average version of utilitarianism is unduly willing to sacrifice some people for the sake of others is not a novel one. Hugo Bedau, Social Justice and Social Institutions. Surely, though, this is not why rape is wrong; the pleasure the rapist gets shouldnt be counted at all, and the whole thing sounds ridiculous. But its fair to say that it has one dominant theme. If the idea is that utilitarianism is wrong in holding that happiness is what is good for us, then the original position argument is irrelevant. . There are really two questions here. Scheffler also suggests that the complexity of Rawls's attitude toward utilitarianism in A Theory of Justice may help to explain his willingness, in Political Liberalism, to treat utilitarianism as a candidate for inclusion in an overlapping consensus. Meriwether Lewis and William Clark on their expedition through the territory of the Louisiana Purchase, from 1803 to 1806. It seems peculiar to suppose that perfect altruists would neglect the distinctness of persons and support the unrestricted interpersonal aggregation to which such neglect is said to give rise.
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